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Abstract
The area of computation called artificial intelligence (AI) is falsified by describing a
previous 1972 falsification of AI by British mathematical physicist James Lighthill. How
Lighthill’s arguments continue to apply to current AI is explained. It is argued that AI should use
the Popperian scientific method in which it is the duty of scientists to attempt to falsify theories
and if theories are falsified to replace or modify them. The paper describes the Popperian method
in detail and discusses Paul Nurse’s application of the method to cell biology that also involves
questions of mechanism and behavior. Arguments used by Lighthill in his original 1972 report
that falsified AI are discussed. The argument uses recent scholarship to explain Lighthill’s
assumptions and to show how the arguments based on those assumptions continue to falsify
modern AI. An important focus of the argument involves Hilbert’s philosophical programme that
defined knowledge and truth as provable formal sentences. Current AI takes the Hilbert
programme as dogma beyond criticism while Lighthill as a mid 20th century mathematical
physicist had abandoned it. The paper explains John von Neumann’s criticism of AI that I claim
was assumed by Lighthill. Next computer chess programs are discussed to show Lighthill’s
combinatorial explosion still applies to AI computer programs but not humans. An argument
showing that Turing Machines (TM) are not the correct description of computation is given. The
paper concludes by advocating studying computation as Peter Naur’s Dataology.
1. Introduction
This paper applies the method of falsification discovered by Karl Popper to show that
artificial intelligence (AI) programs are not intelligent and in fact are just normal computer
programs in which programmers express their ideas by writing computer code. AI is meaningless
metaphysics in the Popperian sense of metaphysics based on a number of incorrect assumptions
and dogmas that was falsified by James Lighthill in his evaluation of AI for the British science
funding agency (Lighthill[1972]). This paper defends Lighthill’s 20th century falsification of AI
and explains how it applies to current AI.
Material is presented that the author developed from being encouraged to criticize AI as a
1960s Stanford University undergraduate and from a talk given to Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy
of science seminar while the author was a computer science (CS in Literature and Science
School) student at UC Berkeley. In order to understand why Lighthill’s criticism falsifies the AI
research programme and why his arguments still apply to AI now in the second decade of the 21st
century in spite of vast improvements in computer speed and capacity, it is necessary to
understand the development of modern computers primarily by physicists after WWII. The paper
uses recent historical scholarship to explain Lighthill’s background assumptions and shows how
that background knowledge also falsifies current AI.
It was not just Lighthill who was skeptical of AI. Physicists in general are critics of AI.
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See for example Roger Penrose’s two books that show the impossibility of artificial minds
(Penrose[1994] and Penrose[2016]). There is a file in David Bohm’s archive at Birbeck College
in London that appears to be Bohm planning to write a paper criticizing AI that I believe was
never written.
The current lack of criticism of the AI research programme may be related to a historical
accident of academic organization at Stanford University in the middle of the 20th century. The
accident was that for some reason Stanford decided not to offer academic appointments to SLAC
physicists who had academic appointments at the institution they came from. Assistant SLAC
director Mathew Sands discussions this in his American Physical Society (APS) interview
(Sands[1987], p. 192). Administrator Albert Bowker who was responsible for starting Stanford’s
computer science as an academic discipline also discusses the problem with SLAC appointments
(Bowker[1979], p. 6). Physicists encouraged the study computation. For example, Niklaus Wirth
developed his various computer languages while working at and being funded by the Stanford
Linear Accelerator (SLAC).
The effect of few physicists with academic appointments and I claim William Miller’s, who
was responsible for the Stanford computer science after Bowker had departed from Stanford,
incorrect understanding of the questionable intellectual standing of AI was that Stanford
computer science became the Stanford AI Lab. For example, assistant CS professor Jeffrey Barth
was fired in 1977 because he refused to work at the Stanford AI Lab. Miller’s explained the idea
for Stanford computer science this way. "I think we tended to focus on fairly rigorous problems
that could be recognized as rigorous problems. We followed the paradigms of more rigorous
disciplines and established it as a science as opposed to an engineering or applied discipline"
(Miller[1979], p. 11). Unfortunately, the result of the Stanford organization resulted in almost
total suppression of criticism of AI.
2. What is Popperian falsification
Falsification is a method discovered by Karl Popper that argues general statements do not
have scientific merit. Only singular statements Popper calls basic statements that have simple
structure have meaning. Such statements can be disproven either by scientific experiments or by
logic (Popper[1968], p. 74). Popper’s major contribution to the philosophy of science is to insist
that it is the duty of every scientist to criticizes one’s own theories to the fullest extent possible so
that false theories can be modified or replaced. Popperians believe scientific method consists of
numerous bold conjectures that are then tested and if falsified, eliminated or modified. Popper’s
method calls for bold conjecture followed by stringent criticism.
Popper’s original falsification theory developed in the late 1920s and early 1930s is called
naive falsification (Lakatos[1999], pp. 64-85). The theory was improved and generalized by
Popper and his colleagues during most of the 20th century. I am using the term Popperian
philosophy in a sense that includes the modifications and improvement to Popper’s theory mostly
carried out at the London School of Economics not just by Popper but also by: Imre Lakatos, Paul
Feyerabend and Thomas Kuhn. The other aspects of Popperian methodology is most clearly
expressed by Imre Lakatos as the Methodology of Scientific Research Pro grammes (MSRP)
(Lakatos[1970]). There were disagreements among the Popperians about questions of emphasis
but not about methodology or importance of rationality in science. James Lighthill, as holder of
the Lucasian chair in applied mathematics at Cambridge University, was familiar with and part of
the milieu that developed Popperian theory.
It is important to understand that falsification needs to be a necessary condition for
scientific research. It is not sufficient because there are situation for which falsified theories need
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to be kept because for example there is no acceptable alternative. Lakatos calls this research
programme competition (Lakatos[1970]).
Falsification as a theory in the philosophy of science is usually discussed in terms of
physics because the developers were trained as physicists. Physics is possibly not a good fit for
study of AI methodology because there is no mechanism or functional explanation involved in
attempting to understand physical reality (describe fields or particle interactions for example).
The connection to cell biology that attempts to understand and utilize the mechanisms of cell
behavior is closer. Paul Nurse in his 2016 Popper Memorial Lecture discusses the importance of
bold conjectures and diligent attempts to eliminate incorrect theory by falsification (Nurse[2016]).
Nurse also discussed data analysis in cell biology. For readers unfamiliar with Popperian
falsification, the Nurse lecture provides an excellent introduction.
Falsification of AI is important because it is claimed that computational intelligence is now
so successful that discussions of ethical issues involving how inferior humans will deal with the
superior intellect of AI robots are required. The author believes the primary obligation of
scientists is to eliminate incorrect theories.
3. Lighthill’s falsification of AI
Lighthill’s falsification of AI is quite simple (Lighthill[1972]) and I claim continues to
apply to AI in spite of changes mostly in vastly faster computers that execute machine
instructions in parallel and new names for algorithms such as "deep learning" that replaces alpha
beta heuristics to improve logic resolution algorithms to implement intelligence. Lighthill argues
AI is just CS described using the language of human intelligence and views computers and
computation as tools for expressing people’s ideas.
Lighthill divides AI into three areas. Category A: Automation (feedback control
engineering), Category C: computer based studies of the central nervous system, and Category B:
the bridge area between A and B that is supposedly going to provide the magic synergy that
allows creation of intelligent robots (p. 3). For example, current deep learning would fall into
areas A and B. It falls into category B because it involves automatic logical deduction without
any need for a person to program ideas into the algorithm, but also it is in category A because it
"looks beyond conventional data processing to the problems involved in large-scale data banking
and retrieval" (p. 5). I think Lighthill is arguing here that AI studies normal computer science but
rephrases problems in terms of human attributes (p. 7 paragraph 2).
According to Lighthill for control engineering it should not matter how the engineering is
accomplished. Lighthill writes in the section discussing category A: "Nevertheless it (AI) must
be looked at as a natural extension of previous work of automation of human activities, and be
judged by essentially the same criteria" (p. 4 paragraph 4). After more than 40 years of computer
development, programmable digital computers are usually the best choice for control engineering.
In modern terms current feedback control engineering is based on improvements in camera
technology allowing more precise location measurements and more complex feedback. Advances
and cost reductions in computer and storage technology allow large amounts of data to be
processed faster and at lower cost.
In criticizing AI’s approach to area C since obviously it makes sense to study
neurophysiology, Lighthill distinguishes syntactic automation as advocated currently by AI versus
conceptual automation (p. 6). He asks if "a device that mimics some human function somehow
assists in studying and making a theory of the function of the central nervous system" (p. 6
paragraph 4).
Lighthill criticizes the use of mathematical logic in AI by arguing practical use runs into a
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combinatorial explosion (p. 10 paragraph 5) and argues there are difficulties in storing axioms
favored by logicians versus heuristic knowledge favored by AI (p. 10, paragraph 6). In my view
this is the crucial falsifier of AI. Namely, although Lighthill was attempting to provide a neutral
assessment of AI, he did not believe in the Hilbert Programme that is the central tenet of AI.
Lighthill also discusses organization problems with AI methodology. He questions claims
such as "robots better than humans by 2000" (p. 13) (now probably replace with 2030). Lighthill
as an mathematical physicist also discusses the combinatorial explosion that allows humans to
solve problems that can not be solved by formal algorithms.
3.1 Understanding Lighthill’s falsification in modern terms
In 1972 Lighthill falsified AI by showing its individual claims were false and by arguing
there was no unified subject but rather just normal problems in the area of computation involving
computer applications and study of data. AI researchers were not convinced at the time, I think,
because Lighthill did not make his Popperian view of science clear. The remainder of this paper
discusses how 1970s scientific background knowledge especially in the physics and applied
mathematics areas falsifies current AI methods. The discussion is possible because of recent
scholarship especially in the areas of Hilbert’s philosophical programme and in the study of John
von Neumann’s thinking during the development of digital computers.
4. Skepticism toward Hilbert’s programme of truth as formal proof
In the 1920s, mathematician David Hilbert conjectured that knowledge and truth consists
solely of all sentences that can be proven from axioms. Hilbert’s original conjecture was a
mathematical problem. However, it was interpreted as a philosophical theory in which truth
became formal proof from axioms. A paradigmatic example is the Birkhoff and Von Neumann
formalization of quantum mechanics as axiomatized logic (Birkhoff[1936], Popper]1968]
attempted to falsify it). Hilbert’s programme as the basic assumption of AI is that knowledge
about the world can be expresses as formal sentences. Knowledge is then expressed as formulas
that can be derived using logic (usually predicate calculus) from other sentences about the world
that are true.
In addition to the belief that knowledge is formal sentences, the foundation of AI is the
belief that the Church’-Turing Thesis (Copeland[2015]) is true. Namely, that nothing can exist
outside of formally proven sentences. proven from axioms. In the AI community this dogma is
beyond criticism. However, the philosophical Hilbert programme was abandoned starting in the
1930s for various reasons. The reason most often given is that Godel’s incompleteness results
showed the Hilbert programme could not succeed. The Hilbert programme is still believed in the
logic area and AI seems to be grasping at straws by attempting to mitigate the Godel disproof by
finding in practice areas where Godel’s results do not apply. Zach[2015] Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy article discusses some attempts to mitigate Godel’s results. See Detlefsen[2017])
for a more skeptical view of Hilbert’s programme.
There were a number of other reasons Hilbert’s philosophical programme was rejected.
These other reasons explain why the AI argument that since people have intelligence, computer
programs can also have intelligence. In the view of AI, the problem is just building faster
computers and developing better algorithms so that computers can discover and learn the formal
sentences in people’s heads. In fact the other reasons the Hilbert programme was abandoned
show why Lighthill’s falsification is correct and why AI is meaningless metaphysics.
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4.1 Von Neumann’s argument automata and neural networks useless at high levels
of complexity
During the second half of the 20th century, John von Neumann’s work on computers and
computations was widely accepted. Publication of Von Neumann’s work on computing did not
occur until years after Lighthill’s falsification was written (in particular Aspray[1990],
Neumann[2005] and Kohler[2001]). Lighthill was certainly familiar with Von Neumann’s work.
John Von Neumann studied automata and neural networks when he was developing his Von
Neumann computer architecture. Von Neumann combined all his skepticism toward linguistics
and automata as sources of AI algorithms in discussing problems with formal neural networks
when he wrote:
The insight that a formal neuron network can do anything which you can describe in words a very
important insight and simplifies matters enormously at low complication levels. It is by no means
certain that it is a simplification on high complication levels. It is perfectly possible that on high
complication levels the value of the theorem is in the reverse direction, namely, that you can
express logics in terms of these efforts and the converse may not be true (Von Neumann[1966],
quoted in Aspray[1990], note 94, p. 321).
Von Neumann also considered and rejected current AI methodology when he developed the
Von Neumann computer architecture. In a 1946 paper with Herman Goldstine on the design of a
digital computer Von Neumann wrote that some sort of intuition had to be built into programs
instead of using brute force searching (Aspray[1990], p. 62). Edward Kohler (Kohler[2000]), p.
118) describes von Neumann’s discovery in developing modern computer architecture in an
article "Why von Neumann Rejected Carnap’s Duality of Information Concepts" as:
Most readers are tempted to regard the claim as trivial that automata can simulate arbitrarily
complex behavior, assuming it is described exactly enough. But in fact, describing behavior
exactly in the first place constitutes genuine scientific creativity. It is just such a prima facie
superficial task which von Neumann achieved in his [1945] famous explication of the "von
Neumann machine" regarded as the standard arc hitecture for most post World-War-II computers.
The problem context in the area of operations research solution space searching that
influenced both von Neumann and Lighthill was pre computer algorithmic operations research
(see Budiansky[2013] for the detailed story). Understanding the limitations of combinatorial
explosion arises naturally from that experience.
4.2 Skepticism toward linguistics and formal languages in computing
Starting with Ludwig Wittgenstein in the late 1930s, skepticism toward linguistics and
especially formal languages become prevalent. Wittgenstein’s claim was that mathematical (and
other) language was nothing more than pointing (Wittgenstein[1930]). The Popperians and
English science in general were receptive to Wittgenstein and his "pointing" philosophy of
mathematics. Popperians avoided linguistic philosophy because they viewed it as creating more
problems than it solved. I read Lighthill’s falsification as assuming this attitude toward language.
Modern AI still claims knowledge and truth is limited to provable formal sentences.
5. Physicist skepticism towards mathematics as axiomatized logic
In my view there was a more important reason for the rejection of Hilbert’s programme.
Physicists were always skeptical toward axiomatized mathematics. Albert Einstein in his 1921
lecture on geometry expresses this skepticism. Einstein believed that formal mathematics was
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incomplete and disconnected from physical reality. Einstein stated:
This view of axioms, advocated by modern axiomatics, purges mathematics of all extraneous
elements. ... such an expurgated exposition of mathematics makes it also evident that mathematics
as such cannot predicate anything about objects of our intuition or real objects (Einstein[1921]).
Niels Bohr argued that first comes the conceptual theory then the calculation. John von Neumann
expressed the physicist attitude with a story relating a conversation with founder of quantum
physics Wolfgang Pauli. "If a mathematical proof is what matters in physics, you would be a
great physicist" (Thirring[2001], p. 5).
6. Finsler’s rejection of axiomatics and general 1926 inconsistency result
In addition to skepticism toward axiomatics, there was also skepticism toward set theory
and its core claim that only sentences that are derivable from axioms (Zermelo Fraenkel probably)
can exist. Swiss mathematician Paul Finsler believed that mathematics exists outside of language
(formal sentences). Finsler claimed to have shown incompleteness in formal systems before
Godel in 1925 and that his proof was superior because it was not tied to Russell’s logic as Godel’s
was. See "A Restoration the failed: Paul Finsler’s theory of sets" in Breger[1996], p. 257 for
discussion of Finsler’s result on undecidability and formal proofs and its history (also
Finsler[1996] and Finsler[1969].
7. Chess - elite human players response to chess programs
Superiority of chess programs over even the best human chess players is cited as evidence
that in the future AI robots will be superior in all areas involving intelligence. In fact the situation
is more complicated. The world’s best chess players are responding in interesting ways. This
corroborates Lighthill’s claims that even in a formal sentenced based toy world, combinatorial
explosion limits problem solving ability of algorithms. Study of chess playing programs and
evaluation of their efficacy show the problems with recent claims of AI successes in general.
In 1997, the Deep Blue chess program defeated then world champion Gary Kasperov.
Since then the world’s best chess players have adjusted to computer chess programs. In the
December 31 Financial Times newspaper chess column, Leonard Barton referring to US
champion Fabiano Caruana writes: "The US champion and world No. 2 unleashed a brilliant
opening novelty, which incidentally showed the limitations of the most powerful computers"
(Barton[2016]).
In the October 14, 2017 Financial Times weekend edition, Barton discusses newer
responses of the best chess players to computer chess programs. The best human chess players
are changing to what are seemingly inferior opening such as Magnus Carlsen’s A3 (left rook
pawn advances one square) because "Grandmasters are turning to the byways of opening theory
as powerful programs analyze main lines to a depth unimaginable before the age of computers."
Computer chess program "intelligence" is not way beyond human skill, but computers are a tool
that allows large improvement in human ability to analyze chess moves. This is similar to
microscopes as tools that allow understanding biological cells in previously impossible ways.
Also, US champion Fabio Caruana is still in the for front of using computers as a tool to
analyze positions. He found a variation on a well established opening "Caruana found a nuance at
move 19 which was so strong that he had a won game while still in his prep." Barton sums up the
reaction to computers as "Carlson’s message is clear. Offbeat openings can save a lot of wasted
preparation."
It has taken two decades and Caruana was only five years old when Kasperov lost to Deep
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Blue, but it appears computer algorithms will encounter combinatorial explosion problems so that
more and more of the best players will be able to defeat computers.
In May 2017, Garry Kasperov published a book on his 1997 match against Deep Blue
"Deep Thinking: Where Machine Intelligence Ends and Human Creativity Begins"
(Kasperov[2017]). Kasperov blames the Deep Blue team psychological harassment for his loss. It
was Kasperov versus a group of chess masters with access to a very good chess position analysis
tool versus Kasparov alone in Kasperov’s view. This illustrates a common pattern in computer
solving of problems. Injection of human knowledge by means of writing computer code is an
integral part of the machine learning.
Possibly more interesting is how the claims show problems with AI scientific methodology
and emphasize the lack of diligent attempts to falsify AI theory. First, the financial incentive
structure of the challenge meant that Kasperov made more money by losing rather than by
winning. From Kasperov’s viewpoint he could win and go back to collecting meager chess
tournament prize money or lose and collect a large appearance fee plus receiving numerous other
appearance fees as a marketing representative. Many AI claims of success involving human
competition with computers follow this pattern. At a minimum, AI tests of this type need to use
double blind protocols. A better method for determining if computers can defeat the best human
players would be to use double blind tournaments where opponents may be humans or computers
and participants and officials were not allowed to know who was who. Even better would be a
system where chess player’s natural competitiveness was utilized so that losing to a lower rated
human player would result in a large deduction of rating points.
Finally, progress in chess playing computer programs shows that chess programs are
normal data processing applications in the Lighthill sense in which human knowledge of chess
can be expressed and amplified by injecting it into computers by writing programs.
8. Turing Machine incorrect model for computation
The central argument for AI is based on the Church Turing thesis. Namely that Turing
machines (TM) are universal and anything that involves intelligence can be calculated by TMs.
Applying Lighthill’s combinatorial explosion arguments, it seems to me that TMs are the wrong
model of computation. Instead a different computational model called MRAMS (random access
machines with unit multiply and a bounded number of unbounded size memory cells) is a better
model of computation (Meyer[2016]). Von Neumann understood the need for random access
memory in his design of the von Neumann architecture (ibid. pp. 5-6). For MRAM machines
deterministic and non deterministic computations are both solvable in polynomial bound time so
at least for some problems in the class NP, the combinatorial explosion is mitigated. TM’s are
universal in the sense that they can compute anything that a von Neumann MRAM machine can
calculate. The problem is that Lighthill’s combinatorial explosion problem is much worse for
TMs than MRAMs because for TMs, problems in NP are probably not computable in polynomial
bounded time, but for MRAMs P=NP so there is no advantage to guessing or using heuristics. I
claim von Neumann understood that random access and bit select capability that is missing from
TMs leads to more problems that can avoid the combinatorial explosion problem.
A problem such as asking if two regular expressions are equivalent is outside the class NP
so the calculation is inherently exponential implying that for algorithms there is no solution to the
combinatorial explosion problem. This suggests that algorithms should be studied as normal data
processing because AI’s assumption that heuristics and guessing will somehow improve
algorithms is problematic.
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9. Conclusion - suggestion to replace AI with Naur’s Dataology
A problem with this paper is that people trained to perform advanced computational
research before the 1970s primarily by physicists can’t imagine AI as having any content, but
people trained after CS became formalized as object oriented programming, computer programs
verified by correctness proofs and axiomatized proofs of algorithm efficiency can’t imagine
anything but computation as formalized logic. Computation researchers trained after the 1970s
are unable to imagine alternatives to the AI dogmas. My suggestion is to adopt the ideas of
Danish computer scientist, who was trained as an astronomer, Peter Naur. Naur argued that
computation should be studied as dataology. dataology is a theory neutral term for studying data.
Naur wrote "mental life during the twentieth century has become entirely misguided into an
ideological position such that only discussions that adopt the computer inspired form" are
accepted. (Naur[2007], 87).
In the 1990s, Peter Naur, one of the founders of computer science, realized that CS had
become too much formal mathematics separated from reality. Naur advocated the importance of
programmer specific program development that does not use preconceptions. I would put it as
computation allows people to express their ideas by writing computer programs.
The clearest explanation for Naur’s method appears in the book Conversations - Pluralism
in Software Engineering (Naur[2011]). This books amplifies the program development method
Naur described in his 2005 Turing Award lecture (Naur[2007]). In Naur[2011] page 30, the
interviewer asks "... you basically say that there are no foundations, there is no such thing as
computer science, and we must not formalize for the sake of formalization alone." Naur answers,
"I am not sure I see it this way. I see these techniques as tools which are applicable in some
cases, but which definitely are not basic in any sense." Naur continues (p. 44) "The programmer
has to realize what these alternatives are and then choose the one that suits his understanding best.
This has nothing to do with formal proofs." dataology without preconceptions and predictions of
imminent replacement of human intelligence by robots would improve the scientific study of
computation. The next step for advocates of AI would be to try to falsify Naur’s dataology.
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